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Plessy V Ferguson And The
Literary IDlagination
Brook Thomas
O
n 7 June 1892, Homer Plessy was arrested for violating Section 2
of Act 111 passed by the Louisiana Legislature in 1890. The law
called for 'equal but separate accommodations for the white and
colored races' on all passenger railways within the state. Plessy's arrest
was part of a planned challenge to the law by New Orleans blacks, who
fanned a committee of protest. In September 1891 the committee had con-
tacted the white lawyer Albion Winegar Tourgee. 1
A resident of upstate New York, Tourgee was perhaps the leading white
spokesman for people of color. Following service in the Union army, he
moved to North Carolina after the Civil War, where he served as a judge.
People from the North who moved South after the Civil War were called
carpetbaggers. Tourgee provided the period's most vivid account of the
experiences of a carpetbagger in his popularly successful autobiographical
novel called A Fool's Errand By One a/the Fools (1879). Continuing his
legal and literary career after he returned to New York, he worked to
expose the Ku Klux Klan and campaigned for improved conditions for
freedmen. Convinced that the only solution to the 'race problem' in the
United States was education, both for whites to reduce racial prejudice and
for freedmen to increase economic opportunity and to inform them as new
citizens, Tourgee actively campaigned for federal money to wipe out illit-
eracy, which was especially high in the South. His proposal was, however,
never adopted.2
When the New Orleans committee contacted Tourgee, it had raised
$1,412.70, but he agreed to work at a distance for no fee. For him the case
was part of a larger project to achieve equal rights for all citizens of the
United States. An important part of that project was to get the United States
Supreme Court to declare segregation laws unconstitutional.
Part of Tourgee's strategy was to have someone of mixed blood violate the
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law, since to do so would allow him to question the arbitrariness by which
people were classified 'colored'. Homer Plessy agreed to be a test case.
Plessy had been born free in 1862. His family was French-speaking. He
had only one-eighth African blood and, according to his counsel, 'the mix~
ture [was] not discemable' (Lofgren 1987: 41). Most likely he could have
passed and ridden in the white car without trouble, but the committee want~
ed a legal challenge. Its challenge received some silent support from rail~
road companies, which did not like the added expense of providing sepa~
rate cars. By pre-arrangement the railroad conductor and a private detec-
tive detained Plessy when he sat in the forbidden coach.
A month after his arrest Plessy came before the court of Justice john
Howard Ferguson. A native of Massachusetts, Ferguson was a carpetbag-
ger who stayed in the South, marrying the daughter of a prominent New
Orleans attorney. Between Plessy~s arrest and his trial, Ferguson had ruled
on another test case in which Daniel F. Desdunes was arrested for travel~
ling in the white car on an interstate train. Also someone who could pass
as white, Desdunes was the twenty-one-year-old son of Rodolphe
Desdunes, one of the leaders of the New Orleans committee. Ferguson
ruled that the law was unconstitutional on interstate trains because of the
federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, and the com-
mittee celebrated. Plessy, however, was travelling on an intrastate train,
and at his trial Ferguson upheld the law, arguing that a state had the power
to regulate railroad companies operating solely within its borders. The con-
stitutional challenge was underway and the decision was appealed to the
state supreme court and eventually to the United States Supreme Court.
As Plessy's argument was that the Louisiana law violated his Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights we need to look at these two amend-
ments, which were the first of three passed after the North's victory over
the South in the Civil War. The Thirteenth Amendment reads:
AMENDMENT XIII [1865]
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
, ._ victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
The primary purpose of the Amendment was to make slavery illegal. Its
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passage was relatively uncontroversial. But the amendment has a compli-
cated history. Those who proposed it did not see it as the first of three
amendments. Instead, they felt that it would be enough to give African
Americans their rightful place in United States society. But people did not
agree on what that place should be. Some felt that all that the amendment
was supposed to do was to free slaves. Others felt that it also banned any
racial discrimination that, in marking blacks with a 'badge of servitude',
perpetuated the heritage of slavery3 Read this way, the amendment gave
Congress power to enact legislation prohibiting most forms of discrimina-
tion.
But passage of laws in the South restricting the rights of blacks soon made
it clear that, if this was the intention of the amendment, its language was
not specific enough. Thus an 1866 Civil Rights Act was passed which pro-
vided more specific guarantees. The 1866 Civil Rights Act provided for
African~Americancitizenship and certain rights with the following lan-
guage:
All persons born in the United States and not subject to any for-
eign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to
be citizens of the United States: and such citizens of every race
and color [including fonner slaves], shall have the same right, in
every State and territory of the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inher-
it, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and sh~1! be subject to like punishments, pains, and penal-
ties, and to none other, any statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, to the contrary notwithstanding.4
Many of these guaranteed civiI rights, such as making and enforcing con-
tracts and holding and conveying property, are economic rights that had
previously been denied to slaves. Guaranteeing these rights to all citizens
was part of the campaign to have the entire country adopt the northern eco-
nomic system.
As fundamental as these rights may seem to us today, sponsors of the 1866
Civil Rights Act worried that its opponents might challenge its constitu-
tionality. Under the federal system of the United States, in which power
was divided between the states and the federal government, such rights had
traditionally been guaranteed by the states, who were responsible for pro-
3S
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tecting citizens within their jurisdiction. For Congress to guarantee them
meant a fundamental change in the relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. Thus, in order to ensure the constitutionality of its
act, the 1866 Congress also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment that,
according to Charles Wallace Collins, shifted 'the court of final appeal
from the State to the Federal Supreme Court' (Collins 1912: 151).
Defenders of states' rights passionately resisted that shift. As Collins notes,
~so far as the records show not one single Democrat in a single State of the
Union' voted for it. For most white southerners the amendment was a par-
tisan and undemocratic 'attempt by one section of the country to force its
political ideals upon another section' (Collins 1912: 144 and 142-3).
Indeed, it was ratified by the states in 1868 only because southern states
could not rejoin the Union without ratifying it. Careful attention to its lan-
guage reveals why it was so controversial.
AMENDMENT XIV [1868]
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law-which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws....
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
The wording of this amendment is much more complicated than that of the
Thirteenth. The fIrst sentence defines the conditions of United States citi-
zenship. It was necessary because, although the Thirteenth Amendment
made slavery illegal, it did not explicitly guarantee fonner slaves citizen-
ship. Indeed, in the infamous Dred Scott case (1857) the Supreme Court
h,ad denied United States citizenship to all African Americans, not just
sl~ves. How it did so is important for an understanding of the legal back-
ground of Plessy v. Ferguson.
As United States citizenship had not been defined in the Constitution,
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, writing for the majority in Dred Scott,
offered an interpretation that linked it with the famous phrase "We, the peo·
pIe of the United States.'
36
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The words 'people of the United States,' and 'citizens,' [Taney
wrote] are synonymous tenns, and mean the same thing. They
both describe the political body, who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen
is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereign-
ty.
Taney's definition implied that there is only one class of citizens and citi-
zens are those who constitute the sovereignty of the country. But Taney
used this democratic-sounding definition to deny citizenship to African
Americans. Allowing for only one class of citizens, he argued that the
'deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation' implanted on
blacks excluded them from the community that originally constituted the
sovereign people of the nation: 19 How 393 at 404 and 416 (1857).
Despite this definition, Taney did admit that African Americans were citi-
zens in some states. The issue, he felt, was whether or not their state citi-
zenship granted them United States citizenship. His answer was no. Since,
according to him, members of the 'negro African race' were not part of the
sovereign people who constituted the country, the only way for one of them
to become a citizen of the United States would be through naturalization.
But the Constitution had granted the power of naturalization to the nation-
al Congress, not to the individual states. Therefore, if an African American
became a citizen in a state, he did not automatically become a United States
citizen.
We must not confound the rights of citizenship, which a state may
confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a
member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because
he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he
must be a citizen of the United States: 19 How 393 at 405, 406
and 405 (1857).5
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment overturned Taney's rul-
ing, making all people born in the United States citizens. Included, there-
fore, were almost all African Americans, whether fonner slaves or not.(vi)
In addition to guaranteeing citizenship, the amendment protects the rights
of those who are citizens. Its second sentence makes it unconstitutional for
any state to 'make or enforce' laws that 'shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.' This provision gave the fed-
37
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eral government important power over the states. Guaranteeing national
citizenship rights, it implied that, if someone is a citizen in one state, he or
she is automatically a citizen of the entire country, and no state can abridge
the 'privileges or immunities' of that citizenship. Once again the language
of the amendment was designed to overturn Dred Scott in which Taney
declared that just because someone 'has all the rights and privileges of a
citizen of a State,' he is not necessarily a 'citizen of the United States.'7
The second clause of the second sentence is its 'due process' clause. Most
of its language simply repeats language from the 5th Amendment. We
might ask why this repetition is necessary. It is, because of the addition of
the words 'any State.' As in the first clause of this sentence, this clause lim-
ited the power of individual states to restrict various rights. Emphasizing
the transfer of power from the states to the federal government, it declares
unconstitutional a state's effort to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. '
As similar as the second clause is to the first in giving the federal govern-
ment control over states, an important change has occurred. The first clause
protects 'citizens'; the second, 'any person.' 'Citizens' has a more restrict-
ed meaning than 'person.' All citizens of the United States are people, but
not all people are citizens of the United States. The authors obviously
wanted to make it clear that citizens of the United States have privileges
and immunities other than the guaranteed protection of life, liberty, and
property.
This distinction is important to keep in mind when we move to the third
clause of the second sentence - the 'equal protection' clause. By guaran-
teeing 'any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws',
this clause might seem to grant all people within a state equality under the
law. But, 'equal protection of the laws' clearly does not mean that every-
one is entitled to the 'privileges and immunities' of United States citizen-
ship. For instance, foreigners living in the United States do not have the
rights of United States citizenship.
Both ,proponents and opponents acknowledged that the Fourteenth
Amendment shifted the balance of power in favor of the federal govern-
ment over the states. Nonetheless, a number of issues of importance for the
Plessy case remained unresolved. One was how expansively the amend-
ment should be interpreted to protect the rights of African Americans. Was
it simply intended to prohibit states from abridging the privileges and .
immunities of citizenship enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, or
38
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should the scope of its protection be interpreted more widely? There is evi-
dence for both a restricted and an expanded interpretation.(viii)
Even if an expanded interpretation is granted, another issue presents itself.
As Alfred H. Kelley puts it, if the two amendments were designed to guar-
antee equality for African Americans, did the meaning of equality forbid
separation by race if equal conditions were provided? (Kelley 1956:
l050)(ix) Once again there is evidence on both sides (Lofgren 1987: 64-7).
As we have seen, Democratic opponents of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment warned that they would bring about total inte-
gration of the races. At the same time, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who spon-
sored the Civil Rights Act, argued that it would not threaten state anti-mis-
cegenation laws because, even though such laws prevented integration,
they treated blacks and whites the same. Both blacks and whites were for-
bidden from marrying someone from the other race and both were pun-
ished equally if they broke the laws. 10
Prior to 1896 the Supreme Court established precedents that adopted a
restricted interpretation of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but before Plessy it had not explicitly ruled on the issue of
separate but equal on intrastate public transportation. It is time, therefore,
to tum the Supreme Court's answer to Tourgee's claim that the Louisiana
equal but separate law violated Homer Plessy's Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Justice Brown delivered the Court's majority opinion
May 18, 1896. It dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment claim almost with-
out argument, citing an earlier ruling and pointing out that segregation is
not slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment claim was, Brown admitted, was
more complicated. To understand its complications we have to tum back to
the 1875 Civil Rights Act passed by a lame-duck Congress, partially in
honor of its main advocate Charles Sumner, who had recently died. The
most comprehensive civil rights act passed after the Civil War, it forbade
numerous acts of racial discrimination. But in 1883 the Supreme Court by
an eight to one majority declared the act unconstitutional. The lone dis-
senter was Justice Jahn Marshall Harlan, the only southerner on the Court
and a fonner slave-owner.
Given the Fourteenth Amendment's various guarantees, this decision
might seem bizarre, but the Court found justification in a close reading of
the amendment. The Civil Rights Act forbade racially discriminatory acts
by private parties. The Fourteenth Amendment's final three clauses limit
state action, not the action of individuals. The Court's point was not to con-
done racial discrimination; it was simply to make clear the limits of feder-
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a1 power under the Fourteenth Amendment. If an illegal act was commit.
ted by a private individual, it was up to an individual state to intervene. The
federal government's role was to control state actions.
Of course, with whites back in control of southern states after
Reconstuction, the chances of states actually punishing racial discrimina-
tion was slim. On the contrary, many began to pass Jim Crow legislation.
The issue in Plessy is how far a state can go: is a state law mandating the
assortment of races on intrastate travel a violation of Fourteenth..
Amendment guarantees?
In his decision Brown first establishes that every state has certain police
powers that can be used for the public good. In Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886)
the Supreme Court had ruled that the use of those police powers was con-
stitutional insofar as the law mandating them was reasonable. The question
facing the Court in Plessy, therefore, was whether the Louisiana law was
reasonable.
In determining the question of reasonableness, [it argued, a legis-
lature] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the pro-
motion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order: 163 US 537 at 550 (1896).
According to this standard, the Louisiana law was deemed constitutional.
Indeed, to stress its reasonableness Brown cites the antebellum
Massachusetts case of Roberts v. City of Boston (1849). Speaking for the
court~ Lemuel Shaw, Hennan Melville's famous father-in-law, declared
that segregated schools did not violate the Massachusetts constitution's
guarantee of equality before the law.
In allowing the legislature great latitude in defining reasonableness, the
Supreme Court exercised restraint, refusing to interfere with the legisla-
ture's power to make laws. This restraint has puzzled some legal scholars
beca~se this Court is noted for its judicial activism, especially on
Fourteenth-Amendment issues. Its activism was motivated by the laissez-
faire desire to keep states from interfering with people's private lives. For
instance, in Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905), it declared unconsti-
tutional a New York state law limiting to fifty the hours that bakers could
work. Such a law, it felt, was an unreasonable state intrusion into a work..;
er's right to contract his labor and thus accumulate property.
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The Court's laissez-faire beliefs are expressed in Plessy when it declares
that Plessy's argument
assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation,
and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an
enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this
proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natura] affinities, a mutual appre-
ciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individ-
uals: 163 US 537 at 551 (1896).
What this statement does not explain is why, therefore, the Court allows the
state to pass a law mandating how races can sit in railroad cars. Though not
explicitly stated, the explanation is implied by the Court's assumption of a
natural difference between the races. For instance, Brown argues,
The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to
enforce equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social as distinguished from polit-
ical equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to both (emphasis added): 163 US 537 at 544
(1896).
Since it is perfectly reasonable to pass laws in conformity with nature, the
Louisiana Jim Crow law is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
whereas the New York law limiting work hours is because it interferes with
natural laws of the-market.
The effect of the Plessy ruling was to allow a system of legally mandated
segregation to exist in the United States from 1896 until Brown v. Board of
Education (1954). But what, we need to ask, does this case have to do with
the literary imagination? I have a two--part answer to that question. First, I
want to examine ways in which the literary imagination contributed to
arguments made in the case. Second, I want to examine literary responses
to the Court's decision.
The crucial figure in the first instance is Tourgee. A close reading of
Tourgee's fiction reveals that he often used it to rehearse legal arguments
that later made their way into court.1I For instance, even before he took
Plessy's case, he imagined the general strategy that he would take in
Pactolus Prime, an 1890 novel about 4black' characters who could pass as
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'white.' In addition to allowing him to rehearse that general strategy, the
novel also allowed him to imagine specific arguments that he could draw
upon later. In one of his most ingenious arguments before the Supreme
Court, Tourgee pointed to Plessy's mixed blood to claim that the Louisiana
law conferred upon the conductor 'the power to deprive one of the reputa-
tion of being a white man, or at least to impair that reputation.' In turn, rep..
utation, he claimed, is a fonn of property because it can affect earning
power. Thus, the law deprived Plessy, at least seven eighths of him, of the
reputation of a white man and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
tection of property. This argument was first worked out in Pactolus Prime
when Tourgee has his black protagonist advise a young mulatto training for
the law to pass as white. Repeating his character's argument in his brief to
the Supreme Court Tourgee asks,
How much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the
practice of law, to be regarded as a white man rather than a col-
ored one? Six-sevenths of the population are white. Nineteen-
twentieths of the property of the country is owned by white peo-
ple.12
If Tourgee used his fiction to rehearse legal arguments that he would make
in support of blacks, those rehearsals in tum helped to determine the form
of his novels. In a subtle way, that fonn suggests a Thirteenth Amendment
argument. It does so by challenging both a literary and legal tradition that
focusses on the concerns of only white Americans. Tourgee's most impor-
tant statement defining the problems facing those treating blacks in fiction
is 'The South as a Field for Fiction,' which appeared in December 1888.
The title alone indicates two ways in which Tourgee invited a reconsidera-
tion of what constitutes American literature. First, to emphasize the impor-
tance of the South was to alter the narrative by which a New England lit-
erary tradition expands into an American one. Second, for Tourgee the
South did not mean the white South but the region in which the lives of
blacks and whites most prominently intersect. Thus an important task for
the writer of southern fiction was to go beyond existing representations of
bl~cks.
About the Negro as a man, with hopes, fears and aspirations like
other men [Tourgee writes], our literature is very nearly silent.
Much has been written of the slave and something of the freed-
man, but thus far no one has been found able to weld the new life
to the old. This indeed is the great difficulty to be overcome. As
42
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soon as the American Negro seeks to rise above the level of the
former time, he finds himself confronted with the past of his race
and the woes of his kindred (Tourgee 1888: 409).
In Pactolus Prime, which was begun as he was writing his essay and seri-
alized from December 1888 to March 1889, Tourgee, with mixed success,
tries to find a formal solution to overcome the great difficulty that he iden-
tifies. That difficulty, it needs to be stressed, has legal implications.
Tourgee's essay and novel anticipate why the Plessy majority's rejection of
Plessy's Thirteenth Amendment claim is flawed.
In hastily dismissing Plessy's claim that Jim Crow laws violate the
Thirteenth Amendment, Justice Brown briefly cites the Civil Rights Cases.
In his decision Justice Bradley had written:
When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of benefi-
cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitant of
that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his eleva~
tion when he takes the ranks of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the law, and when his rights as a citizen or
a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected: 109 US 3 at 26 (1883).
By attempting to find a fictional form to show how the freedman~s life is
still welded to his life as a slave, Tourgee undercut Bradley's logic. The
point is not that at some time the freedman should not take the 'ranks of the
mere citizen,' it is simply that in such a short time after emancipation the
effects of slavery were not yet over. Indeed, to refer to blacks in this peri-
od as the 'special favorite of the law,' is to betray a lack of understanding
of their actual social conditions.
Prior to the Civil Rights Cases the courts had recognized those conditions
and how they were affected by the heritage of slavery by mling that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not simply ban slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, but also acts which branded freedmen with a 'badge of servitude.' For
Tourgee and Harlan Jim Crow laws did just that and thus violated the
Thirteenth Amendment If the majority implied that the Louisiana law was
reasonable because natural social differences existed between blacks and
whites, Tourgee linked those differences to the history of slavery. As his
fiction dramatized, it was not enough simply to abolish slavery, so long as
the effects of slavery's history remained.
43
Tourgee's effort to dramatize the continued effects of that history helps dis..
tinguish his fiction from Mark Twain's. Twain's two most powerlul por-
trayals of race, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Pudd'nhead Wilson,
are written between the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy. Both are set in the
era of slavery, and in both the foremost evil of slavery is, as in Harriet
Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, the reduction of human beings to
pieces of property. Twain's portrayal of slavery allows him to tap into the
widespread belief that all humans had a right to freedom. He can also elic..
it powerful emotional reactions by showing how such a system allowed
family relations to be violated by the logic of the market. But his focus
severely limits his ability to face the 'great difficulty' of welding the life of
the freedman to that of the slave. After all, once the freedman is no longer
a piece of property, the emotional force of Twain's plot disappears.
This limitation may help to explain Steven Mailloux's remarkable discov..
ery that, despite the publication of part of Huckleberry Finn in the 1885
volume of The Century Magazine containing Cable's 'The Freedman's
Case in Equity' and Henry Grady's response, entitled 'In Plain Black and
White,' there is almost no contemporary commentary linking Twain's
novel to debates over the 'Negro Question' (Mailloux 1989: 102).13
Indeed, insofar as Grady makes clear that no one in the New South want-
ed a return to slavery,it could be argued that Twain's portrayal of the inhu-
manity of slavery does not explicitly take sides in the post-Reconstruction
debate. My point is not that Twain lacks concern for blacks after emanci-
pation. Indeed, we can even read both novels as allegorical comments on
the conditions of blacks in the post-Reconstruction period. Nonetheless,
they do not explicitly link the condition of slaves with that of freedmen.
The same could not be said of Tourgee's works.
The worst evil of slavery in Pactolus Prime is not the reduction of human
beings to property. It is the production of a racism that continues to brand
even freedmen with a badge of inferiority. According to Pactolus, 'Slavery
was never half so great a curse as that brand of infamy which stamps the
soul at its birth with ineradicable inferiority' (Tourgee 1890: 45). The end
of slavery does not mean an end to this infamy.
'There are other examples of Tourgee using works of fiction as a testing
ground for arguments that he would make in courts of law. I will come back
to a complicated one at the end. But first I want to tum to examples, not of
the literary imagination shaping legal arguments, but of the Supreme
Court's decision evoking a literary response.
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I can start with Plessy's relation to the African-American literary tradition.
Few doubt the importance of W. E. B. Du Bois' notion of double con-
sciousness for a portion of that tradition. What has not been noted is the
relation between Du Bois' definition and Plessy. The major reason why no
relation has been acknowledged is that in his definition Du Bois makes no
explicit reference to the case. Another reason is that most of us come to the
definition in The Souls ofBlack Folks~ which was published a bit of a dis-
tance from the decision in 1903. But we should not forget that the defini-
tion first appeared in an 1897 Atlantic Monthly essay; that is, immediately
following the ruling. Whether he intended it or not, Du Bois offers one of
the most persuasive refutations of an important part of the majority's logic.
Noting that color forced those of African descent to be considered African
Americans, not simply Americans, Du Bois declares,
After the Egyptian and Indian~ the Greek and Roman~ the Teuton
and Mongolian t the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a
veilt and gifted with second-sight in this American world,-a
world which yields him no [true] se1f-consciousness~but only lets
him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a
peculiar sensation, this double-consciousnesst this sense of
always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of mea-
suring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,-an American, a
Negro; two soulst two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone
keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois 1897: 194; emphasis
added; parenthetical phrase added in Souls).
In tenns of Plessy Du Bois's most important recognition is not simply that
the social and historical conditions of African Americans given them two
souls, it is that they force them to measure their worth by the standard of
whites who deem them inferior. This interiorization of inferiority explains
the majority's blindness when it argues,
We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument to con-
sist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If that
be so~ it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it:
163 US 537 at 551 (1896).
45
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The majority's logic is impeccable. Nothing in the act explicitly claims that
'coloreds' are inferior. For instance, if a white person sat in a colored car
he would be subject to arrest just as if a black sat in a white car. Since
blacks and whites are treated equally under the law, how can it be argued
that the law discriminates against blacks? Du Bois' definition of double
consciousness explains why.
If the majority's logic is impeccable, its history and sociology are serious..
ly flawed. The majority claims that blacks 'choose' to impose a reading
onto an essentially neutral law. What Du Bois lets us see is that blacks'
reading of the law is not a matter of choice. Given the history of race rela..
tions in the country and the social position of blacks in Louisiana, when a
predominantly white legislature passed an act mandating the separation of
the races, blacks could not help but see it as a desire not to associate with
what is perceived to be an inferior race. Indeed, "as Justice Harlan notes;no
one should be deceived by the 'thin disguise' of the law's guarantee of
equality: 163 US 537 at 562 (1896).
Gary Jacobsohn has argued that 'American citizenship is a source of iden~
tity as well as rights' (Jacobsohn: 89). The Plessy majority institutionalizes
double consciousness as African American identity, an identity that influ-
ences the fonn of at least one strain of the African American literary tradi..
tion. Indeed, a large part of the African American tradition combines in a
complicated manner Du Bois's implied Fourteenth Amendment point and
Tourgee's Thirteenth Amendment one. We can see that combination in the
fiction of Charles W. Chesnutt, a trained lawyer who is also one of the most
important figures in the African American literary tradition. Chesnutt has
links with the Plessy argument both before and after the case is decided.
Those before Plessy have to do with his relationship with Tourgee. In a 16
March, 1880, entry in his journal, Chesnutt reveals how the success of
Tourgee's A Fool's Errand was an inspiration to him to pursue a career as
an author (Brodhead 1993: 124-6). As he began to publish, he was in con-
tact with Tourgee, who suggested that he would write a preface for a col-
lection of Chesnutt's short stories. This suggestion occurred ten years
befo(e a collection actually appeared, one without Tourgee's preface.
In a letter to Tourgee 26 September, 1889, Chesnutt described his story
'The Sheriff's Children' as 'dealing with a tragic incident, not of slavery
exactly, but showing the fruits of slavery. '(xiv) To me this comment sent the
message to Tourgee that Chesnutt had read 'The South as a Field for
Fiction,' published the previous December, and was working on dramatiz-
ing its message, a message reinforce in much of his short fiction.
46
Law Text Culture
-
Chesnutt's relationship with Tourgee specifically linked up with the latter's
involvement in the Plessy case in 1893, which is part of Chesnutt's 'silent
period' when he devoteed his energy to providing a secure financial foun-
dation for his family by drawing on his legal, not literary skills. Convinced
that the only way to get the Supreme Court to rule on Plessy's behalf was
to have the public place pressure on the Court, Tourgee tried to establish a
journal to get the public's ear. He asked Chesnutt both to contribute money
and be an editor. Chesnutt was interested, although cautious about the
financial side of the venture. He told Tourgee that he had 'always looked
forward to the literary life, although not specially in the direction of jour-
nalism.'(xv) We will never know if Chesnutt would have given up both his
existing job and his later career as a writer of fiction to become an editor.
The journal lacked financial support and never got off the ground.
Nonetheless, Chesnutt continued to pay close attention to the outcome of
the Plessy case.
Evidence of that attention occurs in allusions in his three novels,
all of which were published after Plessy was decided. The most
obvious is a scene in a Jim Crow car in The Marrow of Tradition
(1901). Forced to ride in a colored car, the book's protagonist Dr.
Miller watches as 4 A Chinaman, of the ordinary laundry type,
boarded the train~ and took his seat in the white cat without objec-
tion. At another point a colored nurse found a place with her mis-
tress' (Chestnutt 1993: 59).
The detail of the nurse alludes to a provision in the 1890 Louisiana law that
exempted nurses_Df children from separate car restrictions. Dr. Miller's
response to this exemption is almost exactly the same as Tourgee's
response in his brief to the court: 'White people ... do not object to the
negro as a servant. As the traditional negro,-the servant,-he is wel-
comed; as an equal, he is repudiated' (Chestnutt 1993: 59). Indeed, since
hardly any blacks had white nurses for their children, this provision betrays
the tme intent of the law.
The detail of the 'Chinaman' reveals how closely Chesnutt read the Plessy
decision. In his dissent Justice Harlan claims,
There is a race so· different from our own that we do not pennit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.
Persons belonging to it are~ with few exceptions, absolutely
excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But by
the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passen-
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ger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens
of the black race in Louisiana, many of whom perhaps risked
their lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by
law, to participate in the political control of the State and nation,
who have all the legal rights that belong to white citizens, are yet
decl,ared to be criminals, liable to imprisonment, if they ride in a
public coach occupied by citizens of the white race: 163 US 537
at 561 (1896).
Both Harlan's and Chesnutt's points of view remind us that even one hun·
dred years ago race in the United States was not simply a black and white
issue. Indeed, both would prove to be wrong about the classification of
Chinese in the South as white. In Gong Lum v Rice (1927) the Supreme
Court upheld Mississippi's ruling that Chinese.Americans were of the 'col·
ored races' and could not attend white schools. Nonetheless, Harlan's and
Chesnutt's evocation of the Chinese reveals how they tried to draw on any
possible argument to demonstrate to the white majority the inconsistency
of Jim Crow laws.
In an unpublished speech entitled 'The Courts and the Negro' Chesnutt
declares:
The opinion in Plessy v Ferguson is, to my mind, as epoch-mak-
ing as the Dred Scott decision. Unfortunately, it applies to a class
of rights which do not make to the heart and conscience of the
nation the same direct appeal as was made by slavery, and has not
been nor is it likely to produce any such revulsion of feeling. 16
Chesnutt's fiction, I am arguing, attempted the difficult job of producing
such a feeling. But I am also making a more general claim: the Thirteenth
Amendment argument made by Tourgee in Plessy, I am suggesting, is kept
alive in literature even though it dies out in the law. Indeed, in Brown v
Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954) the Thirteenth Amendment is not
cited as part of Chief Justice Warren's decision declaring separate but equal
inherently unequal. Warren relies instead soley on the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet in 1952 Ralph Ellison published Invisible Man, which is
one of the most subtle and successful literary embodiments of the problems
for African-American identity brought about by the failure of emancipation
to break away from the effects of a tradition of slavery. An equally suc-
cessful literary embodiment of the Thirteenth Amendment argument is
Toni Morrison's Beloved (1987), whose action occurs both before and after
emancipation. To state my point somewhat differently, if the Thirteenth
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Amendment argument had been accepted by the Court in Plessy, the
African-American, and thus the American, literary tradition would have a
somewhat different shape.
Of course, the major reason that the American literary tradition would have
a different shape is that the Plessy decision affected the shape of American
society. Jim Crow laws were employed to shape American society along
racial lines. One of the most ambitious efforts to reshape a society plagued
by the heritage of slavery and segregation has been affirmative action.
Ironically, however, affirmative action is legitimated by the same constitu-
tional principle upheld in Plessy; that is, racial classifications are accept-
able so long as they are a reasonable measure to promote the social good.17
The debate over affinnative action brings me to my final example of the lit-
erary imagination's relationship to the Plessy case.
The most famous statement in Justice Harlan's dissent is, "Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens': 163
US 537 at 559 (1896). Harlan in tum borrows his metaphor from Tourgee's
brief to the Court. After pointing out that
The exemption of nurses shows that the real evil [for authors of
the law] lies not in the color of skin but in the relation the colored
person sustains to the white. Ifhe is dependent it may be endured;
if he is not~ his presence is insufferable,' [Tourgee proclaims],
'Justice is pictured as blind and her daughter, the Law, ought at
least be color-blind (Olsen 1967: 90).
Because affinnative action is not colorblind, many of its opponents advo-
cate a colorblind Constitution and claim to be the true inheritors of
Harlan's and Tourgee's position.18What they do not know, however, is that
Tourgee first used the metaphor in his 1880 novel, Bricks Without Straw.
In his novel he does not use colorblindness as a positive quality that keeps
people from discriminating. Instead, he describes it as a defect that does
not allow people to see the actual condition of freedmen. Describing how
the freedman had been granted legal rights, the narrator complains, 'Right
he had, in the abstract; in the concrete, none. Justice would not hear his
voice. The law was still color-blinded by the past' (Tourgee 1880: 35).19
Appearing in a chapter entitled 'Nunc Pro Tunc,' a legal phrase meaning
'now for then' that describes acts with a retroactive effect allowed to be
done after the time when they should be done, Tourgee's literary use of the
metaphor indicates that he, like defenders of affinnative action, recognized
how colorblindness could become a myopia keeping the law from acting
dO
iQ
affinnatively to help improve the concrete conditions of those that society
had historically disadvantaged.20
Tourgee's use of the conflicted meanings of a metaphor so hotly debated
today indicates the extent to which we are still in the wake of Plessy. On
the one hand, history teaches us the injustice that can result from not main-
taining a colorblind standard in the law. On the other, it teaches us that
prematurely to evoke that standard in a society that is not yet colorblind is
to continue to disadvantage historically disadvantaged groups. The literary
imagination in the United States will continue both to respond and con~
tribute to debates over that complicated situation.
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NOTES
1 My account of the case is especially indebted to Lofgren (1987). It also relies on Olsen
(1965), Olsen (1967), Fiss (1993), and Medley (1994: 105-1 17). See also Thomas (1996).
2 Tourgee's proposal failed in part because of southern opposition and in part because of
his unwillingness to compromise and support a different measure called the Blair Bill,
which was opposed by the white supremacist Senator John Tyler Morgan. We can only
speculate on what the effects on United States society would have been if Tourgee's plan
had been adopted or if he had compromised his position and helped to pass the less-than-
perfect Blair Bill.
3 See Hyman and Wiecek (1982). The point that legislation unfriendly to blacks consti-
tuted a 'badge of servitude' and thus was unconstitutional was made by Senator Trumbull
in debates over the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Bill and Civil Rights Act. See Fairman
(1971: 1165 and 1173).
4 Once the Act declared: 'That there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of
race, color, or previous condition of slavery;....' But this language was deleted during
debate in the House of RepresentatiYes.
5 In Dred Scott Taney contradicts his earlier ruling that ~every citizen of a State is also a
citizen of the United States' (7 How. 283 at 492).
6 The phrase 'and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' caused some confusion. Were, for
instance, children born in the United States of foreign parents subject to United States
jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of the parents' country? For African Americans the issue
was irrelevant because, even though denied national citizenship by Dred Scott, they were
not Subject to any foreign power. But for other immigrant groups the issue was extremely
important, especially for those not of European or African descent since they were not
allowed to become naturalized citizens. The Supreme Court did not rule on the issue until
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Involving someone born in the United States of
Chinese parents. Wong Kim Ark declared that the citizenship of parents was irrelevant.
7 19 How. 393 at 405 (1857). The first use of 'privileges and immunities' in the constitu-
tional history of the country is in the Articles of Confederation. The second section of the
fourth article of the Constitution states, 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to aU
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.'
8 For restrictive interpretations see Fairman (1971), Belz (1978), Berger (1977). For
expansive interpretations see Hyman and Wiecek (1982), Karst (1989), tenBrock (1965).
Soifer (1987: 1916-59).
9 Kelley, writing in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v Board of
Education (1954), concentrates on the 14th Amendment.
10 Trumbull first makes his argument about anti-miscegenation laws during debates on
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill of 1866, but he repeats it in debates on the Civil Rights Act.
See Fairman (1971: 1164-5 and 1180).
11 The examples that I cite in this essay might suggest that using the literary imagination
to rehearse legal arguments is an inherently liberating activity. But literature can also be
used to imagine repressive legal arguments. On the inability to subordinate the literary
imagination to the dictates of either critical or 'right' reason, see Thomas (1991: 510-
539).
12 Quoted in Olsen (1967: 83).
13 Mailloux lists one minor exception.
14 Letter to Tourgee, September 26, 1889, 'item 4026, Tourgee Collection, Chautauqua
County Historical Society, Westfield, New York.
15 Letter to Tourgee, November 21, 1893, item 7513, Tourgee Collection, Chautauqua
County Historical Society, Westfield, New York.
16 'The Courts and the Negro,' p. 12 (Chesnutt Collection. Fisk University Library).
17 A crucial distinction between the application of the principle in Plessy and affirmative
action is that in the latter racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and should not
stigmatize any group.
18 In University of California Regents v Bakke (1978) Justice Stevens. joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, argues of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
that proponents assumed that the 'Constitution itself required a colorblind standard on the
part of the government' (438 U.S. 265 at 416 [1978)). If this argument had been accepted,
the Court most likely would have struck down affirmative action. But it is a minority
oplIDon.
19 Although Andrew Kull is unaware of this quotation, it confirms his observation that
for his time Tourgee supported versions of affirmative action, which were not afraid of
recognizing race as a legal category, a stand that KulI contrasts with his interpretation of
Justice Harlan's position. Kull also cites Wendell Phillips' and Theodore Tilton's use of
the colof8 blind metaphor (Knlll992: 119-120). When Tourgee first begins his press CaIn8
paign against Jim Crow laws, he praises the New Orleans challenge and adds, ·Thanks to
the civic impulse of an "inferior" race we shall see whether justice is still color-blind or
National citizenship worth a rag for the defense of right or not' (Tourgee 1891: 4).
20 In Bakke Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun argue that we should not
'let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many "created equal"
have been treated within our lifetime as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citi8
zens': 438 U.S. 265 at 327 (1978).
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